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Abstract
Experimental evidence suggest that people only use 1-3 iterations of strategic reasoning, and that
some people systematically use less iterations than others. In this paper, we present a novel evo-
lutionary foundation for these stylized facts. In our model, agents interact in ﬁnitely repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma, and each agent is characterized by the number of steps he thinks ahead. When
two agents interact, each of them has an independent probability to observe the opponent's type.
We show that if this probability is not too close to 0 or 1, then the evolutionary process admits a
unique stable outcome, in which the population includes a mixture of naive agents who think 1
step ahead, and sophisticated agents who think 2-3 steps ahead.
Keywords: Indirect evolution, cognitive hierarchy, bounded forward-looking, Prisoner's Dilemma,
Cooperation. JEL Classiﬁcation: C73, D03.
1 Introduction
Experimental evidence suggest that in new strategic interactions most people only use 1-3
iterations of strategic reasoning. This stylized fact is observed in diﬀerent forms in various
contexts. First, when playing long ﬁnite games, people only look a few stages ahead and
use backward induction reasoning to a limited extent. For example, players usually defect
only at the last couple of stages when playing ﬁnitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, (Sel-
ten and Stoecker (1986) and the other references discussed at the of the introduction) and
∗I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Itai Arieli, Vince Crawford, Peyton Young, and seminar
participants at University of Birmingham, University of Oxford and University College London, for many
useful comments, discussions and ideas.
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Centipede games (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995); Nagel and Tang (1998)), and when inter-
acting in sequential bargaining, players ignore future bargaining opportunities that are more
than 1-2 steps ahead (Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002)). Second, when facing
serially dominated strategies, almost everyone make the ﬁrst iteration (not playing a dom-
inated action), many do the second iteration - assume that their opponent would not play
dominated strategies, a few make the third iteration, and further iterations are rare (Beard
and Beil Jr (1994); Rapoport and Amaldoss (2004)). Third, according to the models of cog-
nitive hierarchy (or level-k), most players best respond to a belief that others use only at
most two iterations of strategic reasoning (see, e.g., Stahl and Wilson (1994); Nagel (1995);
Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998); Bosch-Domenech, Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra (2002);
Crawford (2003); Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004); Crawford and Iriberri (2007)).
A second stylized fact is the heterogeneity of the population: some people systemically use
less iterations than others (see, e.g., Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2005) and Hyndman, Terracol,
and Vaksmann (2012)). These stylized facts raise two related evolutionary puzzles. The ﬁrst
puzzle is why people only use 1-3 steps. Experimental evidence suggest that using more
iterations is only unintuitive but not computationally complex (at-least in simple games):
with appropriate guidance and feedback players can learn to use many iterations in a given
game; however, when facing a new game people immediately return to use only 1-3 iterations
(Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002), Camerer (2003, Section 5.3.5)). In many games,
being able to do one more step than the opponent gives a substantial advantage. As the
cognitive cost of an additional level is moderate, it is puzzling why there hasn't been an
arms race (red queen eﬀect, see Robson (2003)) that caused people to use more strategic
iterations throughout the evolutionary process.
The second puzzle is how the naive people, who systematically use less iterations than
the more sophisticated agents, survived the evolutionary process. At ﬁrst glance, it seems
that naive people would fare substantially less than sophisticated agents who enjoy the beneﬁt
of thinking one level ahead. In this paper we present an evolutionary model that explains both
puzzles and yields a unique sharp prediction: an heterogeneous population which only uses
1-3 strategic iterations. Our model focuses on limited forward-looking in repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma, but we believe that it can also shed light on other forms of bounded iterative
reasoning.
Following the indirect evolutionary approach (Güth and Yaari (1992)) we present a
reduced-form static analysis for a dynamic process that describes the evolution of types
in a large population of agents.1 Each agent has a type (level) in the set {L1, ..., LM}
1 The indirect approach was mainly used to study evolution of preferences. Following, Stahl Dale (1993);
Stennek (2000); Frenkel, Heller, and Teper (2012), we apply it to analyze evolution of cognitive biases.
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C D
C A,A A+1,0
D A+1,0 1,1
Tab. 1: Payoﬀ at the symmetric stage game Prisoner's Dilemma (A > 1).
that determines how many steps he looks ahead (as described in the next paragraph). At
each generation the players are randomly matched and each couple plays M times (without
rematching) the symmetric stage game of the Prisoner's Dilemma with the payoﬀs given in
Table 1:2 mutual cooperation (both players play C) yields both players A > 2 +
√
2, mutual
defection (both players play D) gives 1, and if a single player defects, he obtains A+1 and his
opponent gets 0. Observe that the parameter A is the ratio between what can be gained by
mutual cooperation to the additional payoﬀ that is obtained by defecting.3 The total payoﬀ
from the repeated interaction is the undiscounted sum of payoﬀs. We assume that types are
partially observable in the following way (similar to Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)): before
the interaction begins, each agent has an independent probability p to observe his opponent's
type. Informally, this can be interpreted as an opportunity to observe your opponent's past
behavior, or to observe a trait that is correlated with cognitive level (such as I.Q. level, see
Gill and Prowse (2012)).
An agent of type Lk looks k steps ahead in his strategic reasoning. When the horizon
(the number of remaining stages) is larger than k the agent must follow a simple heuristic -
grim: he cooperates if and only if is opponent never defected before.4 When the horizon
is equal to k, the agent begins to play strategically and he may choose any action. We
interpret Lk's behavior to stem from bounded forward-looking: when the horizon is larger
than k, he subjectively perceives it to be inﬁnite, and he does not take into account the fact
that the interaction has a well-deﬁned ﬁnal period, and that this ﬁnal period has strategic
implications. One can also consider our model as a reduced-form for an interaction with a
random unknown long length, in which each type Lk gets a signal about the interaction's
realized length k periods before the end (see Section 6). Observe that the set of strategies
of type Lk is a strict subset of the set of strategies of type Lk+1, and that type LM is
fully-rational and has an unlimited set of strategies.
2 All our results are independent of the value of M for every M ≥ 4.
3 We assume that defection yields the same additional payoﬀ (relative to cooperation) regardless of the
opponent's strategy to simplify the presentation of the result (but the results remain qualitatively similar
also without this assumption). Given this assumption we normalize, without loss of generality, the payoﬀ of
being a single cooperator to be 0, and the additional payoﬀ of defecting to be 1.
4 In Section 6 we discuss the extension of our model to a setup in which a player may choose his heuristic
for long horizons, and the relation to the notion of analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel (2005)).
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In common with much of the evolutionary literature, we use a static solution concept to
tractably capture the stable points of a dynamic evolutionary process with the following three
properties: (1) the frequency of types changes slowly according to their success: types that
have yielded higher payoﬀs increase at the expense of those that yielded lower payoﬀs, and
(2) given a distribution of types, players learn to best-respond to each other (i.e, they learn
to play a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, given their forward-looking constraints), and (3) rarely
a few mutants with arbitrary type and behavior enter the population; if these mutants have
a completely new type (which has not existed among the incumbents), then it is assumed
that the incumbents learn to best reply to the mutants. This evolutionary process can be
interpreted in two diﬀerent ways: (1) biological process - types are genetically determined,
and the payoﬀ is the expected number of oﬀspring, and (2) learning and imitation process
- an agent's type describes the way he perceives strategic interactions; once in a while an
agent may decide to change his strategic framework and imitate another person's type, if the
other person is more successful.
The conﬁguration of the population is a pair consisting of a distribution of types and the
strategy that each type Lk uses in the repeated game (which must be grim as long as the
horizon is larger than k). A conﬁguration is stable (a variant of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya
(2007)'s deﬁnition) if it satisﬁes 3 conditions: (1) balance - each type in the population
has the same expected payoﬀ; (2) equilibrium - each type uses a best reply strategy; and
(3) resistance - a small group of mutants that enters the population fares worse than the
incumbents.5
Our main result shows that if p is distanced enough from both 0 and 1, then there
exists a unique stable conﬁguration which includes two kind of players: (1) naive agents of
type L1 who only begin defecting at the last stage, (2) sophisticated agents who look 2-3
steps ahead: usually they begin defecting two stages before the end, unless they observe
that their opponent is sophisticated, and in this case, they begin defecting one stage earlier.
The stability relies on the balance between the direct disadvantage of naive agents - they
defect too late, and the indirect advantage - when nativity is being observed, it induces
sophisticated opponents to postpone their defection, and this allows an additional round of
mutual cooperation.6
5 Our solution concept extends the notion of neutral stable strategy (NSS, Maynard Smith (1982)) from
direct evolution, in which types completely determine the actions, to indirect evolution. In Appendix B we
present a few alternative variants to the resistance condition (including Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s
deﬁnition), and we demonstrate that our results are robust to its exact properties.
6 The proportion of sophisticated players is equal to 1p(A−1) . The types of the sophisticated agents are not
uniquely determined. The sophisticated players may have any type of L3 or higher (but all types play as if
they were type L3). If one adds to the model an arbitrarily small cost of having an higher cognitive level,
then all the sophisticated players must have type L3 (see Corollary 1).
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It is interesting to note that stable conﬁgurations are very diﬀerent when p is close to
0 or 1. In both cases, stable conﬁgurations must include fully-rational players who, when
facing other fully-rational agents, defect at all stages. When p is close to 0, types are too
rarely observed, and the indirect advantage of naive agents is too weak. When p is close to
1, there is an arms-race between sophisticated agents who observe each other: each such
agent wishes to defect one stage before his opponent. The result of this race is that there
must be some fully-rational agents in the population.
Existing evolutionary models that studied bounded strategic reasoning (Stahl Dale (1993);
Stennek (2000)) focused on the case where types are unobservable (p = 0), and showed that:
(1) the highest type always survives, and (2) other types may also survive if they do not
play serially dominated strategies. Recently, Mohlin (2012) also dealt also with the case of
fully-observable types (p = 1), and characterized conditions under which other types beside
the highest may survive. This paper is the ﬁrst to study partial observability in such a setup,
which, perhaps surprisingly, leads to a much sharper prediction: a unique stable state in
which everyone thinks 1-3 steps ahead.
Existing experimental results verify the plausibility of both our assumption of using grim
strategy for large horizons, and of our main prediction. Selten and Stoecker (1986) study
the behavior of players in iterated Prisoner Dilemma games of 10 rounds (similar results
are presented in Andreoni and Miller (1993); Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1996);
Bruttel, Güth, and Kamecke (2012)). They show that: (1) if any player defected, then
almost always both players defect at all remaining stages (a grim-like behavior), (2) usually
there is mutual cooperation in the ﬁrst 6 rounds, and (3) players begin defecting at the last
1-4 rounds.7 Such behavior has two main explanations in the literature: (1) some players
are altruistic, and (2) players have limited forward-looking.8 Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and
Rymon (2002) studied the relative importance of these explanations in a related sequential
bargaining game, and their ﬁndings suggest the limited forward-looking is the main cause for
this behavior.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 describes our
solution concept (and in Appendix B we demonstrate the robustness of our results to a few
plausible variants of this concept). In Section 4 we present our results, and it is followed by
7 In Selten and Stoecker (1986)'s experiments players engaged in 25 sequences (super-games) of iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma. The above results describe the behavior of subjects in the last 13 sequences (after
the initial 12 sequences in which players are inexperienced and their actions are noisier). During these 13
sequences there is a slow drift in the behavior of players towards earlier defections. Nevertheless, defections
before the last 4 rounds were infrequent also in the last couple of rounds.
8 Heifetz and Pauzner (2005) explain this behavior with a diﬀerent kind of cognitive limitations: at each
node, each player has a small probability to be confused and choose a diﬀerent action than the optimal one.
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sketches of the proofs in Section 5 (formal proofs appear in Appendix A). We conclude in
Section 6.
2 Model
We study a symmetric ﬁnitely-iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game that repeatsM stages (M ≥
4), denoted by G. The payoﬀ of each stage game are as described in Table 1 (A > 2 +
√
2).
The payoﬀ of the repeated game is the undiscounted sum of the stage payoﬀs. This payoﬀ is
interpreted, as standard in the evolutionary literature, as representing success or ﬁtness.
Deﬁne the horizon of a stage as the number of remaining stages including the current stage.
That is, the horizon at stage k is equal to L− k + 1. History hk of length k is a sequence of
k pairs, where the l-th pair describes the actions chosen by the players at stage l. Let Hk be
the sets of histories of length k, and let H = ∪1≤k<MHk be the set of all histories.
A pure strategy s is a function from H into {C,D}, and a behavioral strategy σ is a
function from H into ∆ ({C,D}). With some abuse of notations we write σ (hk) = C when
σ assigns probability 1 to playing C (and similarly for D). Let Σ be the set of behavioral
strategies. Strategy σ is k-grim if whenever the horizon is larger than k: (1) σ assigns
probability 1 to C if the opponent has never defected before, and (2) σ assigns probability
1 to D if the opponent has defected in the past. Let Σk be the set of k-grim behavioral
strategies. Let u (σ, σ′) be the expected payoﬀ of a player who plays behavioral strategy σ
against an opponent who plays behavioral strategy σ′. Let dk ∈ Σk be the pure strategy that
plays grim as long as the horizon is larger then k, and then defects at all following stages
(when the horizon is at most k).
We imagine a large population randomly matched to play G. Diﬀerent agents in the pop-
ulation diﬀer in their cognitive ability, which is captured by their type. Let L = {L1, ..., LM}
be the set of types (or levels).9 An agent of type Lk looks only k steps ahead, and when
the horizon is larger than k he ignores end-of-game strategic considerations and plays grim -
defecting if and only if his opponent defected in the past. That is, an agent with type Lk can
only play k-grim strategies. When the horizon is at most k, the agent is no longer limited in
his play.
Following the model of partial observability of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), we
assume that each player knows the type of his opponent with probability p (and get no
information about his opponent's type with probability 1 − p), independently of the event
that his opponent knows his type. Let a stranger denote an opponent that his type was not
9 We explicitly omit type of level 0 (who keep using use grim throughout the entire interaction). See
Subsection 4 for a discussion of this assumption, and the inﬂuence of changing it.
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observed.
3 Solution Concept
In this section we formally present a reduced-form stability concept (a variant of Dekel,
Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s notion of stability), which extends neutral stable strategy (NSS,
Maynard Smith (1982)) to indirect preferences. This concept is intended to capture the
essential features of the following three components of the evolutionary process: (1)mutations
- which introduces new types and behaviors in the population, (2) optimization - agents
best respond to the behavior of the population within the limits of their bounded forward
looking, and (3) natural selection - type composition is updated as successful types replicate.
Mutations are modeled by considering an entry of a small group of players of any type
who play any strategy. It is assumed that the population continues to play the pre-entry
equilibrium, except when observing an opponent with a type that did not exist in the pre-
entry distribution; in this latter case the incumbents are assumed to learn to play a best
response to the mutants' strategy. Finally, natural selection is modeled by a static stability
concept that identiﬁes populations of types in which: (1) all types have the same ﬁtness, (2)
any small group of mutants that enter the population fare worse than the incumbents.
Suppose that the distribution of types in the population is given by µ ∈ ∆ (L). Let
C (µ) be the support of µ. The interaction can be analyzed via the following two-player
Bayesian game, Γp (µ). The types of the two players are drawn independently from µ, and
each player with independent probability p observes the preferences of the other. With the
complementary probability 1− p, the player observes the uninformative signal ∅. A strategy
for type Lk is a rule that speciﬁes a behavioral k-grim strategy in the repeated game for each
possible observation: bk : L ∪ ∅ → Σk. We assume that aggregate play in the population
corresponds to a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game. That is, we assume that
each individual of type Lk, when the horizon is at most k , plays a best reply to a correct
belief about the distribution of his opponents' play. When type k is matched with type k′
and plays strategy σk ∈ Σk, the expected payoﬀ of k is:
pu (σk, bk′ (k)) + (1− p)u (σk, bk′ (∅)) .
The payoﬀ is the average over two possibilities. With probability p, the opponent observes
the type k′, and with probability 1−p he observes ∅. An equilibrium b is thus characterized by
two properties. First, type k chooses a k-grim optimal action bk (k
′) conditional on observing
that the opponent's type is k′:
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bk (k
′) ∈ argmaxσk∈Σk (pu (σk, bk′ (k)) + (1− p)u (σk, bk′ (∅)))
for each k′ ∈ C (µ). Second, type k chooses an optimal k-grim action conditional on
observing nothing informative:
bk (∅) ∈ argmaxσk∈Σk
∑
k′∈C(µ)
(pu (σk, bk′ (k)) + (1− p)u (σk, bk′ (∅)))µ (Lk′) ,
Let Bp (µ) denote the set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the game Γp (µ) . Given a popu-
lation distribution µand an equilibrium b ∈ Bp (µ), the average ﬁtness of type Lk ∈ C (µ) is
denoted Πk (µ|b) and is given by:
∑
k′∈C(µ)
[
p2u (bk (k
′) , bk′ (k)) + p (1− p)u (bk (k′) , bk′ (∅))
+ p (1− p)u (bk (∅) , bk′ (k)) + (1− p)2 u (bk (∅) , bk′ (∅))
]
This ﬁtness, which depends on the equilibrium played, is the measure of evolutionary
success for types. Hence, evolution depends both on the distribution of types and the equi-
librium played given this distribution, and the stability deﬁnition applies to conﬁgurations -
(µ, b), where b ∈ Bp (µ).
A conﬁguration is stable if it is satisﬁes two conditions. First, it must be balanced: all
types present must get the same ﬁtness. If the conﬁguration were not balanced, then some
types have higher ﬁtness than others and natural selection would alter the conﬁguration as
the former types multiply and the latter types recede. Formally:
Deﬁnition 1. Conﬁguration (µ, b) is balanced if uk (µ|b) = uk′ (µ|b) for all Lk, Lk′ ∈ C (µ) .
Second, a stable conﬁguration must resist entry by mutants who have some arbitrary
type Lk˜ and play an arbitrary strategy σk˜. We assume that after the entry, the incumbents
continue to play the same against strangers and incumbents, while they play a best response
to the mutant's strategy when they observe a new type, which did not exist in the pre-entry
population. Formally, the post-entry state of the population is described by a perturbed
conﬁguration:
Deﬁnition 2. Given conﬁguration (µ, b), parameter  > 0, type Lk˜ ∈ L and strategy
σk˜ = (σk˜ (k
′) ∈ Σk˜)k′∈C(µ)∪k˜∪∅ for each k′ ∈ C (µ) ∪ k˜ ∪ ∅, let the perturbed conﬁguration(
µ˜, b˜|µ, b, , Lk˜, σk˜
)
where µ˜ ∈ ∆ (L) and b˜ is a proﬁle of strategies for the diﬀerent types in
C (µ˜) be as follows:
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µ˜ (Lk) =
(1− ) · µ (Lk) k 6= k˜(1− ) · µ (Lk˜) +  k = k˜ ,
b˜k (k
′) =

bk (k
′) k 6= k˜, k′ ∈ C (µ) ∪ ∅
k -grim best response to σk˜ (k) k 6= k˜, k′ = k˜ /∈ C (µ)
(1− ) · bk (k′) +  · σk˜ (k′) k = k˜ ∈ C (µ) , , k′ ∈ C (µ) ∪ ∅
σk˜ (k
′) k = k˜ 6∈ C (µ) , k′ ∈ C (µ) ∪ k˜ ∪ ∅
.
Given perturbed distribution
(
µ˜, b˜
)
, type Lk ∈ C (µ˜) and k -grim strategy σk, deﬁne
Πk,σk
(
µ˜|b˜
)
as the expected payoﬀ of an agent of type Lk who plays strategy σk against
population µ˜ who plays b˜. A conﬁguration is stable if mutants fare worse than all incumbents
in any perturbed conﬁguration. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3. Conﬁguration (µ, b) is stable if it is balanced and there exists ′ > 0, such that
for each parameter 0 <  ≤ ′, type Lk˜ ∈ L and strategy σk˜ = (σk˜ (k′) ∈ Σk˜)k′∈C(µ)∪k˜∪∅, the
mutants fare worse than all incumbents in any perturbed conﬁguration
(
µ˜, b˜
)
=
(
µ˜, b˜|µ, b, , Lk˜, σk˜
)
.
That is:
1. If Lk˜ /∈ C (µ) then Πk˜
(
µ˜|b˜
)
≤ Πk
(
µ˜|b˜
)
for each k ∈ C (µ).
2. If Lk˜ ∈ C (µ) then Πk˜,σk˜
(
µ˜|b˜
)
≤ Πk,bk
(
µ˜|b˜
)
for each k ∈ C (µ).
Our notion of stability extends the direct evolution notion of neutral stability strategy. Recall,
that a mixed strategy σ in a normal-form game is neutrally stable (NSS, Maynard Smith
(1982)) if for every strategy σ˜ there exists 0 > 0 such that for every 0 <  ≤ 0:
u (σ˜, σ + (1− ) σ˜) ≤ u (σ, σ + (1− ) σ˜) .
Observe, that when the set of types is a singleton and only includes fully-rational players,
then our Deﬁnition 3 coincides with Maynard Smith (1982)'s neutral stability.
In Appendix B we present a few alternative notions of stability (including Dekel, Ely, and
Yilankaya (2007)'s deﬁnition), which diﬀer in the way the population reacts to the entry of
the mutants, and in how much mutants are required to fare worse than the incumbents, and
we demonstrate that our results are robust to the way in which stability is deﬁned.
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4 Results
Our main result gives a sharp prediction for the unique stable conﬁguration in the interval
A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−2
A−1 . In this conﬁguration naive players (of type L1) and sophisticated players
(who play as if they were L3, and start defecting 2-3 stages from then end) co-exist. Formally:
Theorem 1. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−2
A−1 . A conﬁguration (µ, b) is stable if and only the following
three conditions are satisﬁed:
1. Players of type L1 (dubbed, naive players) have frequency µ (L1) = 1 − 1p(A−1) , and
they all play d1 (play grim until the last stage, and defect at the last stage).
2. There are no players of type L2 (µ (L1) = 0).
3. All other players (types L3 or more, dubbed sophisticated players) play the same strat-
egy: d3 against an observed sophisticated opponent (following grim until the last 3
stages, and defecting at the last 3 remaining stages), and d2 in all other cases.
Let C be the sets of conﬁgurations that satisfy conditions 1-3 above. The sketch of the
proof is presented in the next section, and the formal proof is given in Appendix A.
All the stable conﬁgurations in C are equivalent in the sense that they diﬀer only by the
types of the sophisticated players (L3 or higher) but all of them play as if they had type L3.
If one adds arbitrarily small costs for having higher cognitive levels, then there is a unique
stable conﬁguration in which all the sophisticated players have type L3. Formally:
Corollary 1. Let f : L → R+ be any strictly increasing function on the set of types
(f (Lk) > f (Lk′)⇔ k > k′) that represents cognitive costs. For each  > 0, let the  per-
turbed model be the same as out basic model, except that the ﬁtness of Lk is equal to his
total payoﬀ in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma minus his cognitive cost, which is equal to
 · f (Lk). Then:
1. For suﬃciently small  the game admits a unique stable conﬁguration that only include
naive players of type L1 (that play d1) and sophisticated players of type L3 (that play
d3 against observed sophisticated opponents and d2 otherwise).
2. In the limit when → 0, the share of naive players converge to 1− 1
p(A−1) .
The corollary follows from simple adaptations to the proof of Theorem 1 (proof is omitted).
Our next result, shows that in the benchmark cases when p is close to 0 and 1 the stable
conﬁgurations are very diﬀerent. In both cases, stable conﬁgurations must include fully-
rational players who, when facing other fully-rational agents, defect at all stages. When p is
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close to 0, this occurs because the indirect advantage of lower types is too small and they can
not exist in a stable conﬁguration (because the probability of being identiﬁed by the opponent
is too low). When p is close to 1, there is an arms-race between sophisticated agents who
observe each other: each such agent wishes to defect one stage before his opponent. The
result of this race is that there must some fully-rational agents in the population.
Formally:
Theorem 2.
1. Let 0 ≤ p < 1
(M−2)·(A−1) . Then there exists a unique stable conﬁguration where all
players have type LM and they defect at all stages.
2. Let 1 ≥ p > A−1
A
. Then in any stable conﬁguration there is a positive frequency of
players of type LM , and these players defect at all stages when observing an opponent
of type LM .
5 Sketches of Proofs
In this section we present a few propositions that imply the results of the previous section,
and sketch the intuition behind their proofs. The formal proof are presented in the appendix.
5.1 Stability of the Conﬁgurations in C (Theorem 1 - if side)
The following proposition shows that the conﬁgurations in C are stable in the interval A
(A−1)2 <
p < A−1
A
.
Proposition 1. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
. Any conﬁguration (µ, b) ∈ C (see Theorem 1) is
stable.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. First we have to show that b only includes
best-responses (given the bounded forward-looking). Naive players (L1) play their unique
dominating strategy - d1 (as they must play grim when he horizon is larger than 1). Sophis-
ticated players play d3 against observed sophisticated players. This is optimal (and not d4)
for small enough p. They play d2 otherwise. This is optimal (and not d3) if µ (L1) is large
enough.
Next, we have to show that (µ, b) is balanced. In order to show it, we compare the ﬁtness
of naive and sophisticated agents as a function of their opponent. Naive agents succeed more
only against an observing sophisticated opponent (who observed their type), because their
observed naivety induces an additional round of mutual cooperation. Sophisticated agents
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fare better in the two other cases: against naive opponents and against an unobserving
sophisticated opponent. This implies that there is a unique intermediate level of µ (L1) that
balance the payoﬀ of the two kinds of players .
Finally, we have to show resistance to mutations. If  more naive players join the popula-
tions, then due to the previous argument, naive agents fare worse and the excess frequency of
naive players (the mutants) will be eliminated. The same holds for  more sophisticated who
join the population and play the same as the existing sophisticated players. Finally, one can
show that  sophisticated mutants (type 3 or more) who play diﬀerent actions fare strictly
worse then the incumbents.
5.2 Instability Outside C (Theorem 1 - only if side)
The next proposition shows that any conﬁguration outside C are unstable in the interval
1
A−1 < p <
A−2
A−1 .
Proposition 2. Let 1
A−1 < p <
A−2
A−1 and let (µ, b) be a conﬁguration outside C. Then (µ, b)
is not stable.
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. First, observe that a conﬁguration with a
single type is not stable: 1) if the type is LM , then the entire population defects all the time,
and mutants of type L1 would induce cooperation against them and invade the population;
and 2) if the type is Lk 6= LM , then mutants of type Lk+1 can invade the population and get
strictly higher payoﬀ then the incumbents. Let Lk be the smallest type in the population.
Then, type Lk must always defect when the horizon is k (as it is common knowledge that
all players are rational at that stage), and all other types must defect at horizon k + 1 (or
sooner). The next step is to show that all other types in the population must play dk+1
against strangers. This is because if there is type Lk′ that plays dl (l > k + 1) against
strangers, then it implies (assuming that p is not too small) that type Lk′ fares worse against
Lk, then Lk gets against itself (because members of Lk′ loose at least one round of mutual
cooperation when facing unobserved L1). This implies, that  mutants of type Lk who enter
the population and slightly increase Lk's frequency, would fare better than the incumbents of
type Lk′ (before the entry, both types fared the same as the conﬁguration was balanced; after
the entry Lk's payoﬀ becomes higher because there are more Lk agents). This contradicts
the stability of the conﬁguration.
Next we show that if p is not too close to 1, then all the sophisticated players play dk+2
when they observe that their opponent is sophisticated, and that type Lk+1 cannot exist in
the population (as its members would fare strictly worse then the more sophisticated types).
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Finally, we show that if Lk 6= L1, and p is not too small, then the population can be invaded
by mutants of type L1 as they would fare strictly better than the incumbents of type Lk
(because they induce more mutual cooperation when their type is observed).
5.3 Stable Conﬁguration for Low and High p-s (Theorem 2)
1. Low p-s: The conﬁguration that everyone has type LM (fully-rational) and begin
defecting at the ﬁrst stage is stable because the indirect advantage of naive mutants
(with a lower type than LM) is too small: they strictly lose when their naivety is
unobserved, and their naivety is observed too rarely. Due to a similar argument, in any
other conﬁguration where diﬀerent types co-exist, the lower type would fare strictly
worse (and this implies the uniqueness).
2. High p-s: Assume to the contrary that no agent in the population ever defects at the
ﬁrst stage. Let Lk be the highest type in the population. Let l < M be the horizon in
which Lk players begin defecting when they observe an opponent of type LK . If p is
large enough, their opponent is likely to observe their signal as well and begin defecting
at stage l as well. This implies (again for large enough p) that starting to defect one
stage earlier is strictly better. This implies that either type Lkdoes not play a best
response (if L + 1 ≤ k) or that mutants with type Lk+1 who play like type Lk except
that they defect one stage earlier against Lk opponents would fare strictly better.
6 Concluding remarks
1. Other heuristics for long horizons: In our model we assumed that all players use
a grim heuristic whenever the horizon is larger than their forward-looking ability.
One could relax this assumption by allowing a player to choose his strategy for long
horizons from some ﬁxed set of heuristics. For example, the set of possible heuristics
might be the strategies with memory-1 (which depend only on the actions observed
in the previous stage). Observe that these memory-1 strategies include the grim
heuristics: cooperate at stage 1, and cooperate at any later stage if and only if both
players cooperated at the previous stage. A strategy of a player of type Lk in this setup
speciﬁes two strategic components for each possible signal about the opponent's type:
(1) the heuristic he plays when the horizon is larger than k, and (2) the (unrestricted)
strategy he plays when the horizon is at most k. It is immediate to apply our ﬁrst result
(Proposition 1) in this setup, and show that any conﬁguration in C in which all players
choose grim as their heuristic is stable. We conjuncture that there are only two sets of
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stable conﬁgurations in this extended setup: (1) the eﬃcient conﬁgurations in C in which
all players use a nice (cooperate at the ﬁrst stage) and retaliating heuristic (defect
if your opponent defected at the previous stage), and (2) ineﬃcient conﬁgurations in
which all players defect at all stages (and use always-defect heuristics).
2. Analogy-based expectation equilibrium: Our model of bounded forward looking
types could also be formulated using Jehiel (2005)'s Analogy-Based Expectation Equi-
librium (ABEE). In this formulation a player of type Lk bundles all nodes with horizon
of at least k into a single analogy class (while fully-diﬀerentiating among nodes with
horizons smaller than k), and expects his opponent to play the same in all nodes of this
class. The requirement that players play a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a conﬁgura-
tion (restricted by k-grim consistency) is replaced with the requirement that players
play an ABEE in a conﬁguration: at each stage every player best-responses to his
analogy-based expectations, and expectations correctly represent the average behavior
in every class. As in the previous remark: (1) it is immediate to show that every con-
ﬁguration in C is stable in this formulation, and (2) we conjuncture that there are only
two sets of stable conﬁgurations in this ABEE formulation: eﬃcient C-like conﬁgura-
tions (in which everyone is nice and retaliating in his non-trivial analogy-class), and
ineﬃcient conﬁgurations in which all players defect at all stages.
3. Random continuation probability: Our model assumes that the repeated interac-
tion has a deterministic constant length, and that players completely ignore this fact
when the horizon is too large. These assumptions may seem unrealistic. However,
one should note that the model may be a reduced-form for a more realistic inter-
action with a random length and incomplete information. Speciﬁably, let T be the
random unknown length of each interaction. Assume that the interaction lasts at least
M rounds (Pr (T ≥M) = 1), and that the continuation probability at each stage
(Pr (T > n|T > n− 1)) is not too far from 1. Bounded forward-looking is modeled in
this setup as the stage in which a player becomes aware to the timing of the ﬁnal period:
player of type Lk gets a signal about the ﬁnal period of the interaction (i.e., about the
realization of T) k stages before the end. In this setup, players are not restricted in
their strategies (each type may play any strategy at any horizon). As in the previous
remarks: (1) it is immediate to see that any conﬁguration in C is stable, and (2) we
conjuncture that other stable conﬁgurations are only those in which everyone defects
at all stages.
4. Level 0: In the main model we do not allow players to belong to level-0 (L0) who
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follow grim strategy at all rounds of the interaction. Such level-0 players play a
strictly-dominated strategy (cooperating at the last stage), and we chose to omit them
from the model as such extreme bounded forward-looking may seem implausible. We
note that our results are qualitatively robust to the addition of type L0 in the following
sense. All of our results would remain shift a single step backwards: the naive players in
the stable conﬁgurations in C would be of type L0 instead of L1, and the sophisticated
players would look 1-2 steps ahead instead of 2-3 steps.
5. Other games: The formal analysis deals only with iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. How-
ever, we conjuncture that the results can be extended to other games in which iterated
reasoning decreases payoﬀs. In particular, the extension of our results to centipede-
like games (Rosenthal (1981)) is relatively straightforward. Such game can represent
sequential interactions of gift exchanges. Such interactions were important in primitive
hunter-gatherer populations (see, e.g., Haviland, Prins, and Walrath (2007), P. 440),
which driven the biological evolution of human characteristics.
A Proofs
A.1 Proposition 1 - Stability of Conﬁgurations in C
Proposition. 1 Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
. Any conﬁguration (µ, b) ∈ C (see Theorem 1) is
stable.
Proof. We divide the proof into three lemmas: we ﬁrst show that the conﬁguration is balanced
(Lemma 1), then we show that the conﬁguration only includes strict best replies (Lemma 2),
and ﬁnally we show stability against mutations (Lemma 3).
Lemma 1. Any conﬁguration (µ, b) ∈ C is balanced.
Proof. Let q = µ (L1) be the frequency of the naive players. A naive player gets (L− 1)A+1
against a naive opponent, and (L− 2)A+ 1 against a sophisticated player. A sophisticated
player gets (L− 2)A+(A+ 1)+1 = (L− 1)A+2 against naive, and against a sophisticated
opponent he gets : (L− 3)A+3 if both players identify each other, (L− 3)A+(A+ 1)+2 =
(L− 2)A+3 if only he identiﬁes his opponent, (L− 3)A+0+2 if only his opponent identiﬁes
him, and (L− 2)A+ 2 if both players identify each other. The diﬀerent types get the same
payoﬀ if:
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q ((L− 1)A+ 1) + (1− q) ((L− 2)A+ 1) = q ((L− 1)A+ 2) + (1− q) ·(
p2 ((L− 3)A+ 3) + p (1− p) (((L− 2)A+ 3) + ((L− 3)A+ 2)) + + (1− p)2 ((L− 2)A+ 2))
(1− q) ((L− 2)A+ 1− ((L− 3)A+ 1 + 2p2 + p (1− p) (A+ 2 + 1) + (1− p)2 (A+ 1))) = q
q = (1− q) (A− (2p2 + p (1− p) (A+ 3) + (1− p)2 (A+ 1)))
q = (1− q) (A− (p2 (2− A− 3 + A+ 1) + p (A+ 3− 2A− 2) + (A+ 1)))
q = (1− q) (A− (p (1− A) + (A+ 1)))
q = (1− q) (−p (1− A)− 1) = (1− q) (p (A− 1)− 1)
q (p (A− 1)− 1 + 1) = p (A− 1)− 1
q =
p (A− 1)− 1
p (A− 1) (1)
Observe, that for each p ≥ 1
A−1 we get a valid value of 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
Lemma 2. In any conﬁguration (µ, b) ∈ C all types play a best response (thus, these conﬁgura-
tions are well deﬁned). Moreover, any deviation that induces a diﬀerent play on-equilibrium-
path, yields a strictly worse outcome.
Proof. We have to show that all types play a best response (among the k-grim strategies).
This is immediate for the naive player, as his only choice is between cooperating and defecting
at the last stage, and the latter strictly dominates the former. We have to show that the
sophisticated players play best responses. It is immediate that d2 is a strict best response
against naive opponents. Next, we show that playing d2 against a stranger is strictly better
than playing d3. This is true if the following inequality holds (looking at the payoﬀ of the
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last 3 rounds):
q (2A+ 2) + (1− q) (2p+ (1− p) (A+ 2)) > q (A+ 3) + (1− q) (3p+ (1− p) (A+ 3))
q (A− 1) > (1− q)
q >
1
A
Using (1) one obtains:
p (A− 1)− 1
p (A− 1) >
1
A
pA (A− 1)− A > p (A− 1)
pA2 − pA− A > pA− p
p
(
A2 − 2A+ 1) > A
p >
A
(A− 1)2
It is immediate that d2 is also strictly better (against strangers) than any other strategy
that induces a diﬀerent play on-equilibrium-path. We are left with showing that it is strict
better for a sophisticated player to play d3 and not d4 against a sophisticated opponent (and
this immediately implies that d3 is strictly better against identiﬁed sophisticated opponents
than any other strategy that induces a diﬀerent play on-equilibrium-path). This is true if
the following inequality holds (focusing on the payoﬀs of the last 4 rounds, as all preceding
payoﬀs are the same):
p (A+ 3) + (1− p) (2A+ 3) > p (A+ 4) + (1− p) (A+ 4)
(1− p) (A− 1) > p
A− 1 > Ap
p <
A− 1
A
Lemma 3. Any conﬁguration (µ, b) ∈ C is stable.
Proof. We have to show resistance against mutations (for all variants of stability presented
in this paper). Observe ﬁrst that naive players fare strictly worse than sophisticated agents
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against naive opponents (the sophisticated players obtain an additional ﬁtness point by de-
fecting when the horizon is equal to 2). As the conﬁguration is balanced, it immediately
implies that sophisticated players fare strictly worse than naive agents against sophisticated
opponents. This implies that if  naive (sophisticated) players join the population and play
the same as the naive (sophisticated) incumbents, then naive (sophisticated) agents would
fare worse (as their number has become larger and they fare worse against themselves). This
implies that the mutants would fare worse than all the incumbents. Next, observe that any
mutants of type L2 would fare strictly worse than the sophisticated players: L2 players would
fare the same when they do not observe their opponent, and fare strictly worse when they
observe a sophisticated opponent. Finally, if sophisticated mutants enter the population and
play diﬀerently on-equilibrium-path, then they would earn strictly less due to Lemma (2).
A.2 Proposition 2 - Instability of Conﬁgurations Outside C
Proposition. 2 Let 1
A−1 < p <
A−2
A−1 and let (µ, b) be a conﬁguration outside C. Then (µ, b)
is not stable.
The proposition follows immediately from the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. If any player ever defects in a conﬁguration, then both players defect at all
following stages.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that player 1 defected at some stage of the game. After the
deviation it is common knowledge, that player 1 plays rationally. Similarly, it is also common
knowledge that player 2 either defects (if his horizon hasn't arrived yet) or play rationally.
The fact that the game is dominance solvable then implies that both players must defect at
all the following stages.
The lemma immediately implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2. It can be assumed without loss of generality that in any conﬁguration, and
given any signal about the opponent, all players play with positive probability only strategies
dl for some l.
Lemma 5. Let (µ, b) be a conﬁguration. Let type Lk ∈ C (µ) be the smallest type in the
population. Then: (1) Lk always defects with probability 1 at horizon k; (2) all other types
in the population always defect with probability 1 at horizon k+ 1; and (3) if 1
(M−2)·(A−1) < p
and µ (Lk) = 1 then the conﬁguration is not stable.
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Proof. It is common knowledge that all types are at least k. This implies that defecting
when the horizon is equal to k is the unique strategy that survives iterations of eliminating
dominated strategies, and thus all players must defect with probability 1 when the horizon is
equal to k given any signal about the opponent (as the strategy proﬁle in a conﬁguration must
be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium). This, in turn, implies that all agent of type higher than k
must defect with probability 1 at horizon k + 1. To prove part (3), observe that if k < M ,
then  mutants of type Lk+1 would fare strictly better than the incumbents. If k = M , 
mutants of type L1 would fare strictly better than the incumbents: with probability 1 − p
the mutant's type is unobservable and he would obtain 1 point less than the incumbents
(when facing an incumbent). With probability p the mutant is identiﬁed and he obtains
(M − 2) · (A− 1)−1 points more than the incumbents. This implies the mutants would earn
strictly more than the incumbents if and only if:
1− p < p ((M − 2) · (A− 1)− 1)⇔
p >
1
(M − 2) · (A− 1) .
Lemma 6. If Players of type Lk are indiﬀerent between playing dl and dl′ against strangers
with k ≥ l > l′ in a stable conﬁguration, then they can not play dl′ with positive probability.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that players of type Lk are indiﬀerent between defecting at
horizon l and horizon l′ when playing against strangers, and that they play dl′ with positive
probability. Consider mutants of type Lk who defect at horizon l against strangers (and
play the same as the incumbents in all other cases). Such mutants would fare strictly better
than the incumbents of type Lk who happen to begin defecting against strangers only at
the smaller horizon l′: pre-entry both strategies yielded the same payoﬀ, now as there a bit
more early defectors, defecting at the larger horizon l is strictly better. This implies that the
conﬁguration cannot be stable or adjusting-stable.
The lemma immediately implies the following corollary:
Corollary 3. All players only use pure strategies when playing against strangers in a stable
conﬁguration.
Lemma 7. Let p < A−2
A−1 . Let (µ, b) be a balanced conﬁguration. Let type Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be
the smallest type in the population. Assume that there exist type k2 who begins defecting at
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horizon l2 (with probability 1) against strangers and that k1 < l2− 1. Then, the conﬁguration
is not stable.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that type Lk1 gets an higher payoﬀ when playing against Lk1
than Lk2 gets against Lk1 (because if this holds, then an entry of  mutants of type Lk1 who
play like the incumbents would violate stability and adjusting-stability). Due to Lemma 5,
type k1 always begin defecting at stage k1, and thus gets against itself the following payoﬀ:
(L− k1)A + k1. Type k2 gets 1 more if he observes k1's type (probability p), but gets
(l2 − k1 − 1) (A− 1) − 1 less if he doesn't observe (probability 1 − p). Thus type k1 gets a
higher payoﬀ against itself if:
((l2 − k1 − 1) (A− 1)− 1) (1− p) > (A− 2) (1− p) > p
This holds if:
p <
A− 2
A− 1
Lemma 8. Let 1
A−1 < p <
A−2
A−1 . Let (µ, b) be a balanced conﬁguration. Let Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be
the lowest type in the population. Then:
1. Type Lk1 always plays dk (begin defecting at horizon k). All other types Lk 6= Lk1 play
dk1+1 against strangers and against an observed Lk1, and play dk1+2 when they observe
an opponent with any other type Lk 6= Lk1.
2. If µ (Lk1) 6= 1− 1p(A−1) then the conﬁguration is not stable.
3. If k1 > 1 then the conﬁguration is not stable.
Proof.
1. Type Lk1 behavior is immediately implied from Lemma 5. By Lemma 8, all other types
Lk 6= Lk1 play dk1+1 against strangers (and against observed Lk1). If p < A−1A , then by
a similar argument to the one given in Lemma 2 all other types Lk 6= Lk1 play dk1+2
against observed types Lk 6= Lk1 .
2. Assume ﬁrst that µ (Lk1) = 1. If k1 < N then  mutants of type k1 + 1 who always
play dk1+1 would earn strictly more than the incumbents. If k1 = N , then we show
that  mutants of type L1 would fare strictly more than the incumbents. The mutants
would get 1 less point than the incumbents when their type is unobserved, and (N − 2)·
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(A− 1)− 1 more points if their type is observed. Thus, they would earn strictly more
than the incumbents if:
1− p < p · ((N − 2) · (A− 1)− 1)⇔
1 < p · ((N − 2) · (A− 1))⇔
p >
1
(N − 2) · (A− 1) ,
which holds for every p > 1
A−1 (as N > 2). We are left with case that µ (Lk1) < 1. In
this case, the balance between the payoﬀ of type Lk1 and the higher types implies (in
the same way as in the proof of Lemma 1) that µ (Lk1) = 1− 1p(A−1) .
3. Now assume k1 > 1. Consider  mutants of type 1 who enter the population. We show
that these mutants earn strictly more than type k1. This is true because type 1 and
type k1 get the same payoﬀ whenever their types are unobserved and their opponent
has a type larger than k1. Type k1 gets at most 1 more point when the opponent is of
type k1. Type 1 gets at least A− 1 points more when the opponent identiﬁes him and
has type larger than k1. Thus the mutants would get a strictly higher payoﬀ if:
(1− µ (k1)) p (A− 1) > µ (k1)
p (A− 1) > µ (k1) (1 + p (A− 1))
p(A−1)
1+p(A−1) > µ (k1) = 1− 1p(A−1) = p(A−1)−1p(A−1)
Which always holds.
A.3 Theorem 2 - Stable Conﬁgurations Near 0 and 1
Theorem. 2
1. Let 0 ≤ p < 1
(M−2)·(A−1) . Then there exists a unique stable conﬁguration where all
players have type LM and they defect at all stages.
2. Let 1 ≥ p > A−1
A
. Then in any stable conﬁguration there is a positive frequency of
players of type LM , and these players defect at all stages when observing an opponent
of type LM .
Proof.
1. We begin by showing the stability of the conﬁguration in which all players have type
LM and they defect at all stages. It is immediate that player best respond to each
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other and that the balance property holds. By a similar argument to the proof of
Lemma 5,  mutants with type k < L would fare worse than the incumbents if and
only if 1
(M−2)·(A−1) < p. This implies that the conﬁguration in which all players are
fully-rational and defect at all stages is table if and only if p < 1
(M−2)·(A−1) .
Next we show that no other conﬁguration is stable when p < 1
A−1 (thus, if
1
(M−2)·(A−1) <
p < 1
A−1 then no stable conﬁguration exist). By Lemmas 7 and 10, in any stable
conﬁguration, all players have wither type Lk and they always play dk or they have
higher types and they play against strangers dk+1. If the entire population has type Lk
and k < M , then mutants type Lk+1 would earn strictly more. Otherwise, by similar
arguments to those given in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 if p < 1
A−1 then either the
conﬁguration is unbalanced, or the higher types do not play a strictly best reply.
2. Assume ﬁrst that no fully-rational players exist in the population: µ (LN) = 0. In this
case, fully-rational mutants who defect one stage earlier then an identiﬁed opponent
with the highest existing type, and imitate that highest existing type in all other
cases, would earn strictly more then the incumbents. Now, assume that fully-rational
players exist, and that they play dk when observing a fully-rational opponent for some
k < N . Consider fully-rational mutants who play dk+1 when observing a fully-rational
opponent, and imitate incumbents otherwise. Such mutants would get 1 more point
against a fully-rational opponent if both players identify each other. If only they identify
their fully-rational opponent they would get at most A−1 less points. In all other cases
they would fare the same as the fully-rational incumbents. This imply that the mutants
would fare strictly better if:
p > (1− p) · (A− 1)⇔
pA > (A− 1)⇔
p >
A− 1
A
B Robustness to Alternative Stability Notions
In this appendix we present a few alternative notions of stability (Subsection B.1), and we
demonstrate the robustness of our results to the exact way in which stability is deﬁned
(subsection B.1.2). The presentation and the discussion of the alternative deﬁnitions may be
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of a separate interest for readers who are interested in applications of indirect evolutionary
approach in other setups.
B.1 Alternative Deﬁnitions of Stability
In this subsection we present a few alternative ways to deﬁne stability, which diﬀer in: (1)
the way mutant's payoﬀ is compared with the incumbent's payoﬀ, (2) the way incumbents
react to entry of mutants.
B.1.1 Weak Stability
The requirement in Deﬁnition 3 that the mutants must earn lower ﬁtness than any incumbent
may be too strong. When the entrants earn more than some incumbents, but less than
the mean payoﬀ of the incumbents, the mutants would be eliminated from he population.
However, in this case it is not clear in general if the induced decline in the frequency of the
incumbents who fare the worst would cause the aggregate behavior to move farther from the
equilibrium. In some examples, the aggregate behavior would move back to the equilibrium.
One such example, is a variant of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game with a victory yielding 1.5
and a loss giving -1. Assume that there are 3 types in the population {rock, scissors, paper},
and that each type limits its members to only use its action (i.e., types directly determine
member's actions). Further assume that the pre-entry distribution of types is uniform over
all these 3 types. Then an entry of  mutants of type rock would violate our notion of
stability (Deﬁnition 3), because the entrants would fare strictly better than incumbents of
type scissors. Yet, it is well known that under the replicator dynamics, such mutants (that
fare, on average, worse than the incumbents) would be eliminated without disturbing the
equilibrium (see, e.g., Neeman, 1980).
In what follows we present a weaker notion, according to which entrants are only required
to fare on average worse than the incumbents. We interpret this notion as a necessary
requirement for evolutionary stability, and we use it to reﬁne our uniqueness results in the
next subsection. Formally:
Deﬁnition 4. A conﬁguration (µ, b) is weakly-stable if it is balanced and there exists 0 > 0,
such that for each 0 <  ≤ 0, Lk˜ ∈ L and strategy proﬁle σk˜ = (σk˜ (k′) ∈ Σk˜)k′∈C(µ)∪k˜∪∅, the
mutants fare worse on average than the incumbents in any perturbed conﬁguration
(
µ˜, b˜
)
=(
µ˜, b˜|µ, b, , Lk˜, σk˜
)
. That is:
1. If Lk˜ /∈ C (µ) then Πk˜
(
µ˜|b˜
)
≤∑k∈C(µ) µ (k) · Πk (µ˜|b˜).
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2. If Lk˜ ∈ C (µ) then Πk˜,σk˜
(
µ˜|b˜
)
≤∑k∈C(µ) µ (k) · Πk,bk (µ˜|b˜).
It is immediate to see any stable conﬁguration is also weakly-stable.
B.1.2 DEY- Stability (Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007))
A diﬀerent way one may criticize our deﬁnition of stability is our assumption that the incum-
bents continue playing the same strategy unless they observe a new mutant type. This implies
that post-entry the incumbent may play an approximate best response, but not necessarily
an exact one. This is because they do not take into account the presence of the  mutants
when playing against strangers. Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s notion of stability takes
the opposite assumption: post-entry the incumbents adapt their strategies such that the
new strategy proﬁle is again an exact equilibrium. They require that there exists post-entry
equilibria in which the incumbents play is only slightly changed (dubbed, approximate focal
equilibria), and that in all these equilibria the mutants would fare worse then all incumbents.
In order to formally present their notion, we shall introduce some notation. LetN0 (µ, Lk˜)
be the set of all distributions resulting from entry by no more than 0 mutants of type Lk˜ to
population µ. Formally:
N0 (µ, Lk˜) = {µ′ : µ′ = (1− )µ+ Lk˜, 0 ≤  < 0}
Let δ ≥ 0. Beginning with a conﬁguration (µ, b), and following an entry by at most
0 mutants of type Lk˜ leading to µ˜ ∈ N (µ, Lk˜) , an equilibrium b˜E ∈ Bp (µ˜) is δ-focal if
incumbent's behavior is changed by at most δ, that is,
∣∣∣b˜Ek (k′)− bk (k′)∣∣∣ ≤ δ (whenever p > 0)
and
∣∣∣b˜Ek (∅)− bk (∅)∣∣∣ ≤ δ (whenever p < 1) for all Lk, Lk′ ∈ C (µ).10 An equilibrium is focal
if it is 0-focal. Notice that when the entrants have a new type (Lk˜ /∈ C (µ)), then a δ-focal
equilibrium does not restrict the behavior of entrants, nor does it restrict the behavior of
incumbents when they observe that they have been matched with mutants. Let Bδp (µ˜|b)
denote the set of all δ-focal equilibria relative to b if the post-entry distribution is µ˜.
Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) assume that any focal equilibrium can potentially arise
following a mutation. Thus, DEY-stability requires that in all of them, entrants earn no
higher ﬁtness than any incumbent. However, not all post-entry populations will have focal
equilibria. In that case, they require that approximate focal equilibria exist, and that in all
of them entrants earn no higher ﬁtness than any incumbent. Formally:
10 We simpliﬁed the original more complex notion of almost-focal equilibria in Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya
(2007), using the fact that the set of possible types in our setup is ﬁnite.
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Deﬁnition 5. A conﬁguration (µ, b) is DEY-stable if it balanced and for every δ0 > 0 there
exist 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ0 and  > 0 such that for every Lk˜ ∈ L and µ˜ ∈ N (µ, Lk˜), uk
(
µ˜|b˜
)
≥ uk˜
(
µ˜|b˜
)
for all b˜ ∈ Bδp (µ˜|b) and Lk ∈ C (µ).
We think that Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s assumption that the incumbents adjust
their play to have an exact post-entry equilibrium in less plausible when the mutants have
a type and play a strategy that was already existed before the entry. Such  mutants can
enter the population very quickly. In particular, they may not be mutants in the biological
sense, they may simply be the result of a small diﬀerence between the realized number of
oﬀspring of some type and its expectation. Such a small change in the distribution of play,
which does not introduce of a new type or a new strategy, is unlikely to be unnoticed, and
the incumbents may not have an opportunity to adjust their play in this case.
Moreover, Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s adjustment causes their notion to be incon-
sistent with Maynard Smith (1982)'s neutral stability, and to predict counter-intuitive result
in the following example: a single-stage 2-strategy (T and B) symmetric coordination game
with a single fully-rational type. One can see that the mixed symmetric equilibrium that
gives equal weight to both actions is DEY-stable, while it is not stable according to our def-
inition, nor it is neutral stable a` la Maynard Smith (1982). Consider, an entry of  mutants
who play T . Such an entree is adjusted by the incumbents slightly decreasing the probability
of choosing T from 0.5 to 0.5− ). Such a prediction is counter-intuitive: ﬁrst, it is not clear
how the incumbents become aware about the mutants, and second, the incumbents adjust by
playing less often the better strategy (the one that before the adjustment yielded a strictly
higher payoﬀ).
B.1.3 Adjusting-Stability
When the mutants have a new type (or play a new strategy that was never played before),
the adjustment to a new exact equilibrium seems more plausible, as the incumbents imme-
diately observe things (types or actions) that were never existed before, thus the entree is
quickly recognized. With this intuition we oﬀer the following deﬁnition which is a mixture
of our original deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 3) and DEY-stability. Speciﬁcally, when checking if a
conﬁguration is adjusting-stable we assume that post-entry behavior of incumbents is unad-
justed (perturbed conﬁguration as in Deﬁnition 2) if the mutants both have a type and play
a strategy that existed in the pre-entry population, and it is adjusted into an approximate
focal equilibrium if the type or the strategy are new (formal deﬁnition is straightforward and
it is omitted for brevity).
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B.1.4 Undominated-Stability
In our solution concept we assume that incumbents best reply to observed mutants (who
belong to new types that have not existed in the population before). One can relax this
assumption, and allow the incumbents to play against observed mutants any strategy that is
not strictly dominated. With this relaxed assumption, one can deﬁne undominated-stablity,
by requiring that mutants would fare worse than incumbents in any perturbed conﬁguration
and given any undominated strategy the incumbents play against observed mutants (not
necessarily a best reply). It is immediate to see that undominated-stablity implies stability.
B.2 Robustness of The Results
In this subsection we show that our results are robust to other deﬁnitions of stability:
1. The stable conﬁgurations (the set C) that we characterized in Theorem 1 are also stable
according to all other deﬁnitions.
2. All other conﬁgurations (outside C) are also unstable according to the adjusting-stability
and undominated-stability variants (in the same interval of p-s).
3. The weak-stability and DEY-stability variants may induce other stable conﬁgurations,
but all of them (in the interval max
(
1
(M−2)·(A−1) ,
1
(A−1)2
)
< p < 1− 2·A−1
A2−A) would have
similar properties to the conﬁgurations in C: the population will include naive players
of type L1 and sophisticated players of higher types who start defecting only 2-4 stages
before the end.
B.2.1 Adjusting-stability and Undominated-stability
It is immediate to see that all the proofs of our results (Appendix A) hold also for adjusting
stability and undominated stability. In particular, the only place in the proofs that we relied
on incumbents best-responding to observed mutants was in part (3) of Lemma 8, where entry
of mutants of type L1 was considered. In this case, the incumbents have a unique dominating
strategy against identiﬁed mutants, and thus the proof remains unchanged.
B.2.2 Weak-Stability and DEY-Stability
Lemmas 1-5 hold for weak-stability and DEY-stability with minor adaptations. In particular,
it is immediate that any conﬁguration in C is also weakly-stable and DEY-stable. However,
the proofs of Lemmas 6-7 are not valid for the setup of weak-stability and DEY-stability.
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The following proposition shows that any weak-stable or DEY-stable conﬁguration has key
properties that are qualitatively similar to the conﬁgurations in C : the population will include
naive players of type L1 and sophisticated players of higher types who start defecting 2-4
stages before the end.
Proposition 3. Let max
(
1
(M−2)·(A−1) ,
1
(A−1)2
)
< p < 1− 2·A−1
A2−A and let (µ, b) be a weakly-stable
(resp., DEY-stable) conﬁguration. Then:
1. 0 < µ (L1) < 1. Players of type L1 always play d1.
2. All other types Lk 6= L1 only start defecting at the last four rounds.
Proof. The proposition follows from the following three lemmas.
Lemma 9. Let (µ, b) be a weakly-stable (resp,. DEY-stable) conﬁguration, let Lk1 ∈ C (µ)
be the lowest type in the population and let p > 1
(M−2)·(A−1) . Then µ (Lk) < 1, and the mean
probability that a random player with type diﬀerent than Lk1 plays dk1+1 against strangers
(denoted by q) is at-least:
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p)
.
Proof. µ (Lk1) < 1 is implied by Lemma 5 (which is valid also for weak-stability and DEY-
stability). Type Lk1 gets (L− k1) ·A+k1 points when playing against itself. A random player
with a type diﬀerent than Lk1 who plays against Lk1 gets at most (L− k1) ·A+ k1 + 1 when
he observes his opponent's type, and an expected payoﬀ of at most q ((L− k1)A+ k1 + 1) +
(1− q) · ((L− k1 − 1)A+ k1 + 2). This implies that other types fare better when playing
against Lk1 than the payoﬀ that Lk1 gets against itself only if (subtracting the equal amount
of (L− k1 − 1) · A+ k1 from each payoﬀ):
A ≤ p · (A+ 1) + (1− p) · (q · (A+ 1) + 2 · (1− q))
A ≤ 1 + p · A+ (1− p) · (q · A+ 1− q)
A− 1
1− p ≤ q · A+ 1− q
A− 1− 1
1− p ≤ q · (A− 1)
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1− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) ≤ q
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) ≤ q (2)
The conﬁguration may be weakly-stable (resp., DEY-stable) only if (A−1)·(1−p)−1
(A−1)·(1−p) ≤ q.
Lemma 10. Let (µ, b) be a weakly-stable (resp., DEY-stable) conﬁguration, let Lk1 ∈ C (µ)
be the lowest type in the population, and let 1− 2·A−1
A2−A > p >
1
(M−2)·(A−1) . Then:
1. No player defects with positive probability against strangers at horizon strictly larger
than k1 + 2.
2. No player defects with positive probability against any other player at horizon strictly
larger than k1 + 3.
Proof.
1. Assume to the contrary that there is a type who defects with positive probability against
strangers at horizon l > k1+2. This implies that dl yields a weekly better payoﬀ against
strangers than dk1+2. This can occur only if:
q · (1− p) · (A− 1) ≤ ((1− q) + qp) · 1
q · (1− p) · (A− 1) ≤ 1− q · (1− p)
q · (1− p) · A ≤ 1
q ≤ 1
(1− p) · A.
Substituting (2) yields:
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) ≤
1
(1− p) · A
A · ((A− 1) · (1− p)− 1) ≤ (A− 1)
A · (A− 1) · (1− p)− A ≤ A− 1
A · (A− 1) · (1− p) ≤ 2 · A− 1
1− p ≤ 2 · A− 1
A · (A− 1)
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p ≥ 1− 2 · A− 1
A2 − A ,
and we get a contradiction to p < 1− 2·A−1
A2−A .
2. Strategy dl (l > k1 + 3) may yield a better payoﬀ than dk1+3 only if:
(1− p) · (A− 1) ≤ p · 1
A− 1 ≤ p · A
A− 1
A
≤ p.
The latter inequality cannot hold because 1− 2·A−1
A2−A <
A−1
A
for every A > 1.
Lemma 11. Let (µ, b) be a weakly-stable (resp. DEY-stable) conﬁguration, let Lk1 ∈ C (µ)
be the lowest type in the population, and let 1− 2·A−1
A2−A > p > max
(
1
(M−2)·(A−1) ,
1
(A−1)2
)
. Then:
1. If every type diﬀerent than Lk1always plays dk1+1against strangers, then the conﬁgura-
tion must be in C.
2. If there are types who play with positive probability dk1 + 2 against strangers than
µ (Lk1) ≤ 1A .
3. k1 must be equal to 1.
Proof.
1. If everyone besides type Lk1 always plays dk1+1 against strangers, then we can immedi-
ately apply the arguments in the proof of Lemma 8, and conclude that the conﬁguration
must be in C.
2. The fact that there are types who play with positive probability dk1+2 against strangers
implies that dk1 + 2 yields a weakly-better payoﬀ than dk1+1 against strangers. This
implies that:
µ (Lk1) · (A− 1) ≤ (1− µ (Lk1)) · 1
µ (Lk1) ≤
1
A
. (3)
3. Assume to the contrary that k1 > 1. Observe that  mutants of type L1 would fare
strictly better than the incumbents of type Lk1(and thus would fare strictly better than
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all incumbents in the post-entry perturbed-conﬁguration / approximate focal equilib-
rium) if:
p · (A− 1) · (1− µ (Lk1)) > µ (Lk1) · 1
p · (A− 1) > µ (Lk1) · (1 + p · (A− 1))
p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) > µ (Lk1) .
Substituting (3) yields:
p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) >
1
A
p · A · (A− 1) > 1 + p · (A− 1)
p >
1
(A− 1)2
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